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THE VIRTUAL CLERK'S OFFICE: A PROPOSED MODEL 

JUDGMENT LIEN ACT FOR THE COMPUTER AGE 

Charles Shafer* 
I INTRODUCTION 
Winning a money judgment is often just the beginning of the cred­
itor's journey. The law places the burden on the judgment creditor to 
find and obtain sufficient assets to satisfy the judgment.1 But in at­
tempting to satisfy judgments, a creditor faces a thicket of statutes, 
court rules, and case law that have grown up over the last two centu­
ries.2 The basic rules arose when real property was the primary source 
of wealth and, without phones or automobiles, public records through­
out the state were not easily accessible. Nevertheless, except for inter­
est accruing at a fairly moderate rate,S there is no penalty for a 
* Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law; Charles Shafer, Baltimore, MD. 
Thanks to Lisa Lenderman for valuable research assistance. 
1. Robert L. Haig & Patricia O. Kahn, Representing the Judgment Creditor, 16 AM. J. TRIAL 
ADVOC. 1 (1992). For example the prime rate on corporate loans was 8.75% pm September 26, 
1995. WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 1995, at C21. A home equity loan is tied to and above the prime rate. 
Timothy L. O'Brien, Prime-Rate Cut May Benefit Consumers, But Impact Now Appears Psycho­
logical, WALL ST. J., July 10, 1995, at A2. Credit card rates are also tied to the prime rate and can 
average about 6% above the prime rate. See Nancy Ann Jeffrey, Fees on Variable-Rate Credit 
Cards Rise, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 1995, at Cl. 
2. Jeffrey, supra note 1, at Cl. See also Francis E. Stepnowski, Less Than Perfected: Uncer­
tainty in IIlillOis Judgment Lien Law, 13 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 33, 33-35 (1992). 
3. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 685.010 (West 1987) (10%); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 5­
12-102(4)(b) (1989) (contract rate or 8%), 13-21-101 (personal injury actions: 9%); ILL. ANN. 
STAT., ch. 735,115/2-1303 (Smith-Hurd 1992 & Supp. 1994) (9%); MD. CODE ANN, CTS. & JUD. 
FROC. § 11-107 (1994) (10%); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 5004 (McKinney 1992) (9%); VA. CODE 
ANN. § 6.1-330.54 (Michie 1994) (9%). Interest in judgments obtained in United States Courts is 
based on the rate of interest on one-year United States Treasury Bills. 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) (1988). 
The interest rate as of October 31, 1994 was only 6.06%. Interest on judgments is usually not 
compounded. Similarly, some states have adopted variable interest rates. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. 
§ 5-12-106(2)(a) (1989) (where judgment is appealed: "the rate of interest a commercial bank pays 
to the federal reserve bank of Kansas City using a government bond. . . as security. . . is rounded 
to the nearest full percent"). 
Such interest is simple interest, not compounded. Westbrook Y. Fairchild, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 277, 
280-81 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); Lewis v. Stran-Steel Corp., 373 N.E.2d 714 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978). 
However, the federal government and some states have provided for compounding post judgment 
interest. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1961(b) (1988); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ S-12-102(4)(b), 5-12­
106(2)(a), 13-21-101(1) (1989). 
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debtor's failure to pay a judgment creditor. For example, debtors do 
not have to fear imprisonment in the vast majority of cases.4 
This article addresses one aspect of the law regarding the satisfac­
tion of judgments: when a creditor is determined to have a lien on 
property of the debtor. The unnecessary cumbersomeness of the present 
system, which limits the ability of creditors to promptly obtain a legally 
cognizable interest in specific property, hampers creditors in preventing 
the debtor's use, sale, or hypothecation of property that could be used 
to satisfy their debts.5 This is particularly true of intangible property 
and property where federal law or the law of sister states controls 
transfers. Not only do judgment creditors face the risk that the debtor 
will voluntarily dissipate or transfer assets, but also the risk that they 
will be defeated by subsequent parties who deal with the debtor, be­
come creditors, and are able to find assets. Possibly the most pernicious 
of those subsequent creditors are the federal and state taxing authori­
ties. The tax lien, once filed, locks in all personal and real property of 
the debtor.a Bankruptcy also presents a serious difficulty for the judg­
ment creditor. If the debtor files for bankruptcy before the creditor can 
locate personal property of the debtor, the creditor (despite having ob­
tained a judgment) has no greater priority than all of the unsecured 
creditors of the debtor. If the judgment creditor locates personal prop­
erty and obtains a lien on that property shortly before the date that the 
debtor files a Bankruptcy petition, the creditor's lien can be avoided as 
a preference.7 Even where a debtor files a Chapter 11 petition and 
maintains control of the business as a debtor in possession, the debtor 
can still use the preference section to avoid the creditor's lien.s 
This article proposes that the computer systems currently being 
introduced to automate court systems around the country serve as the 
It should be noted that the interest afforded is probably not comparable to the interest that the 
market would dictate for a similar risk. 
4. Most states, by constitution or statute, prohibit imprisonment for debt. See. e.g., ALA. 
CONST. art. I, § 20; CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE § 501 (West 1979). However, there are exceptions for 
support obligations or particular types of conduct such as fraud. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. I, 
§ 17 (civil arrest for absconding debtors); ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 18 (fraud); ARK. CONST. art. 2, 
§ 16 (fraud); MD. CONST. art. III, § 38 (support obligations); NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 14 (fraud, libel 
or slander). 
5. For example, a security interest in personal property is subject to a judicial lien. U.C.C. 
§ 9-301(1)(b). The judicial lien might not arise until execution. See infra note 9. 
6. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 6321, 6323(a) (1988); MD. CODE ANN., TAX-GEN. §§ 13-805, 13­
808 (1988). 
7. Unless the creditor is an insider, a lien obtained within 90 days preceding the bankruptcy 
filing is an avoidable preference. II U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B) (1988). 
8. II U.S.C. § 1l07(a) (1988). 
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vehicle for the implementation of major reforms in the substantive and 
procedural law regarding judicial liens. The most significant change 
would involve the creation of statewide judgment liens on virtually all 
of the property of the debtor. This article will explore how the proposed 
system might deal with various types of property and particular third 
parties, and how to solve some of the transitional problems involved in 
adopting such a system. The changes proposed are incorporated in a 
Model Judgment Lien Act (MJLA) which is set forth in the Appendix 
of this article. It is hoped that the MJLA makes clear precisely how 
the rules discussed in the article would operate. 
II. THE PRESENT SYSTEM 
Although judgment creditors are entitled to have real property 
sold in order to satisfy their judgments, their priority vis-a-vis other 
creditors and purchasers is usually based upon the date when they ob­
tained a lien on the specific piece of property.9 Since the creditor must 
do little more than actually obtain the judgment and (possibly) see that 
an appropriate filing is made, the lien is usually referred to as a judg­
ment lien. 10 In some states, the judgment creditor need do nothing at 
all to obtain the lien on all real property in the county in which the 
judgment was rendered.ll Often even in those states, only the judg­
ments of certain courts automatically create liens. 12 In other states, the 
creditor always may have to affirmatively file or docket the judgment 
with the court or in the land records to obtain a lien. 13 In some jurisdic­
tions, judgments from small claims courts may never become a lien on 
real property.14 Once the judgment creditor has obtained a judgment 
lien on property in the county in which the judgment was rendered, the 
creditor may obtain a lien on the debtor's property in other counties by 
recording the judgment in the appropriate office or court of those coun­
9. See, e.g., N.Y. CIY. PRAC. L. & R. 5203(a) (McKinney Supp. 1994). 
10. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 845 (6th ed. 1990). 
11. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 624.23 (West 1989 & Supp. 1994); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. 
& JUD. PROC. § 11-402 (1993). 
12. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 11-402(b) (1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. 
§ 511.350(1) (Vernon Supp. 1994). 
13. See CAL. CIY. PROC. CODE § 697.310 (West 1987 & Supp. 1994); COLO. REY. STAT. 
§§ 13-52-102 (West 1987 & Supp. 1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-380a (West 1991) Uudg­
ment creditor must specify the property); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 511.350(2) (Vernon Supp. 1994); N.Y. 
CIY. PRAC. L. & R. 5203(a) (McKinney Supp. 1994). In 1967, Tennessee, which had not required 
any filing by the judgment creditor, changed its procedure to require such a filing. See TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 25-5-101(b) (1980 & Supp. 1994). 
14. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 482.365 (Vernon Supp. 1994). 
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ties. lIS The basis for the territorial limitation on judgment liens is no 
doubt that it would be unfair for someone buying land in one county to 
have to check the court records in other counties. lS 
Although three states (Alabama, Georgia and Mississippi) do ex­
tend the judgment lien to personal property as well as real property,!': 
most states require more for the creditor to obtain a lien on the 
debtor's personal property. The lien on personal property is typically 
called an execution lien because the creditor must initiate the execu­
tion process, that is the process involved in the seizure and sale of the 
property, to obtain a lien. ls The procedure consists of the following: (1) 
the creditor obtains a writ of executionl9 from the court clerk and de­
livers that writ to the sheriff; (2) the sheriff then locates and either 
seizes the property or leaves it where located and attaches a notice on 
or near the property (and may take other steps to secure the property); 
(3) the sheriff then sells the property.20 States vary with regard to 
whether the lien is created as of the date of the delivery of the 
paperwork to the sheriff21 or as of the date of the seizure of the prop­
erty,22 with the latter being the majority rule. Some states have re­
cently instituted procedures whereby judgment creditors can secure 
IS. See MD. CODE ANN., Cn. & JUD. PROC. § 1I-402(c) (1993). 
16. See, e.g., Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor Implement & Vehicle Co., 195 S.W. 
762 (Tenn. 1917). 
17. ALA. CODE § 6-9-211 (1990), reads in part: "Every judgment, a certificate of which has 
been filed as provided in section 6-9-210, shall be a lien in the county where filed on all property of 
the defendant which is subject to levy and sale under execution ...." (Emphasis added.) 
GA. CODE AN1\. § 9-12-80 (Supp. 1993), reads in part: "All judgments obtained in the superior 
courts, justice of the peace courts, or other courts of this state shall be of equal dignity and shall 
bind all the property, both real and personal, from the date of such judgments except as otherwise 
provided in this Code." (Emphasis added.) 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-191 (1989): "A judgment so enrolled shall be a lien upon and bind all 
the property of the defendant within the county so enrolled, from the rendition thereof ..." (Em­
phasis added.) 
18. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 568 (6th ed. 1990). 
19. The nomenclature and specifics vary. For example, in Illinois, the creditor must deliver a 
"certified copy" of the judgment. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 735, 11 5/12-111 (Smith-Hurd 1992). 
20. See Haig & Kahn, supra note 1. at 24-25. 
21. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 735, 11 5/12-111 (Smith-Hurd 1992); Robinson v. Wright, 9 P.2d 618 
(Colo. 1932). In states where the lien arises upon delivery of the writ to the sheriff, that lien only 
applies to property upon which the sheriff actually levies before the return date of the writ. First 
Nat'l Bank of Center v. Monte Vista Hardware Co., 226 P. 154, 156 (Colo. 1924). 
22. See CAL. CIY. PROC. CODE § 697.710 (West 1987 & Supp. 1994); IOWA R CIv. PROC. 
626.33 (Supp. 1994). 
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liens on personal property by a filing similar to a filing to perfect a 
security interest under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.2s 
The present system often makes the acquisition of an execution 
lien (and thus the ability to limit the debtor's ability to use, sell, or 
hypothecate the property or to protect the property through bank­
ruptcy) dependent upon both the creditor's ability to locate the prop­
erty and to convince the sheriff to seize the property. A sheriff may not 
be willing to do so if she cannot be sure of the debtor's title, or if 
seizure would be impractical or dangerous.24 In addition, the creditor 
may have to provide the funding necessary for maintaining or storing 
the seized property until it has been sold.26 
Moreover matters are complicated further when the property in­
volved is intangible, such as stock, notes or intellectual property. Intan­
gible property is not often the type of property on which a sheriff may 
execute. Therefore, even if state statutory schemes allow for the even­
tual sale of such property to satisfy the judgment creditor's claim, the 
creditor's priority may be based only on the date of the sale or court 
proceeding ordering the transfer of such property.2S 
III PROPOSED MODEL JUDGMENT LIEN ACT: THE VIRTUAL 
CLERK'S OFFICE 
The proposed statute is based on the premise that it will soon be 
possible for everyone to go to one office to obtain information about the 
status of a party's interest in property. That one office will not exist in 
23. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 697.510 (West 1987 & Supp. 1994) (limited to specified com­
mercial property); CONN. GEN. STAT, ANN, § 52-355a (West 1991) (limited to nonconsumer judg­
ments); ME, REV, STAT, ANN, tit. 14, § 4651-A (West Supp. 1994). 
24. California explicitly provides that the levying officer shall only demand delivery of the 
property of the judgment debtor and shall make no further effort to obtain custody. The judgment 
creditor must then apply to the court for an order directing the levying officer to "seize the property 
in the private place." Then if the property is not voluntarily delivered the levying officer may use 
force unless there is a substantial risk of serious bodily injury. CAL. CIV, PROC, CODE § 699.030 
(West 1987). 
25. See Haig & Kahn, supra note 1, at 44-49. The following hypothetical illustrates one of the 
problems presented to judgment creditors: Judgment creditor A obtained a judgment and writ of 
execution on January 1, but was unable to convince the sheriff to execute on Debtor's inventory. 
Creditor B obtained a judgment on February I, and was successful in convincing the sheriff to 
execute. Under the laws of Alabama, Georgia and Mississippi, A would still be entitled to the pro­
ceeds of the property because he had priority under those states' laws. Alternatively, in other states, 
where a lien is created upon execution by the sheriff, B would have priority. 
26. See Cherie L. Lieurance, Judgment Creditors' Access To Intellectual Property 
Rights-Is Simple Execution In Sight?, 7 WHITTIER L. REV, 375 (1985). 
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any particular location but will exist in "cyberspace."27 The office will 
be a "virtual clerk's ojJice."28 Many state and federal courts have al­
ready begun the process of making the records of each court's docket 
available to computer searches.29 Ideally these filing systems will con­
27. "Cyberspace" commonly refers to the information sent and received through the use of 
computer networks. See Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for "Cyberspace," 55 U. PITT, L. 
REV, 993, 994 (1994). 
28. "Virtual clerk's office" refers to an electronic service which performs tasks which to date 
have been performed in a clerk's office. For purposes of this article, I am referring to the service of 
making available records of court proceedings. Of course, other functions of clerks' offices can and 
will be available electronically: 
The first element of the virtual courthouse is already a reality in some locations. A recent 
amendment to Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits electronic filing of 
papers. Filing of scanned images of documents is already widespread and could become ubiq­
uitous within a few years. Already in many federal and state courts, the docket is accessible 
by computer from beyond the courthouse doors. Courts of appeals and supreme court opin­
ions are now available on-line in some courts without charge, and other innovations are on the 
horizon, Most steps to the virtual clerk's office have been accomplished with little controversy, 
because their efficiencies are plain and external costs are minimal. 
Gordon Bermant & Winton D. Woods, Real Questions About the Virtual Courthouse, 78 JUDICA­
TURE 64, 64-65 (1994). 
29. Information technology is on the rise in court systems across the country. It has been 
estimated that automation can cut tim~ and financial resources spent on the lawsuit process enor­
mously by allowing expedition of the litigation process, case management, and statistical reporting at 
the appellate level. See Robert Anderson et aI., The Impact of Information Technology on Judicial 
Administration: A Research Agenda for the Future, 66 S. CAL. L. REV, 1761, 1764 (1993). See also 
John G. Sakellaris, Computerized Access to Court Information, 23 MD, 8.J. 35 (1990). Clearly, 
automating the court system is the most efficient means in which to handle the ever-expanding 
caseloads of the courts, ld. 
The public can access judgment information from federal district courts and bankruptcy courts 
through the Public Access to Court Electronic Research System (PACER). Michael Webb, Elec­
tronic Access to Court Records: What's Available Now and What's Coming, AM. BANKR. INST, J., 
12-17 (July/Aug. 1995); Robert Ambrogi, Finding Court Decisions on the Internet, 38 RES, GESTAE 
44 (June, 1995). 
Many states have already begun the process of automating all aspects of the court system, from 
charging a plaintiff with a cause of action, to recording a rendered judgment. See Kevin P. Kilpa­
trick, Automation In Courts On the Rise, 14 NAT'L L.J. 39 (1991), Often, court computer systems 
are accessible to anyone who has a personal computer, a standard modem and the appropriate 
software, Such communications software which provides access to LEXIS/NEXIS and/or Westlaw 
shall suffice to connect with many court computer systems. See Sakellaris, supra, at 36. 
In the Maryland state court system, the Judicial Information System ("JIS") is a computerized 
service which allows attorneys to communicate with the court clerks, to file and receive motions and 
other documents which expedite the litigation process enormously, and to avoid unnecessary trips to 
the courthouse. Id. at 35, 41. Another function of JIS is to provide the user with information on 
judgments and liens in particular counties, given the debtor's name and other pertinent data, One 
may be connected to JIS at a modest initial fee of fifty dollars, plus twenty-five cents per minute of 
use.Id. 
In the Massachusetts state court system, a new computer system has been implemented in the 
superior courts of the three most populated counties, which accounts for over one half of the state's 
caseload. Telephone Interview with Richard Duggan, Director of Information Systems at the Office 
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tain a record of all suits filed, pre-judgment attachments, lis pendens 
notices, judgments and renewal of judgments from all state and federal 
of the Chief Administrative Justice, Boston, Massachusetts (Sept. 29, 1994). Under this system, 
cases are processed from the filing of the first pleading to the recording of the judgment. Individuals 
may access lien information from terminals by searching for the person's name and/or docket num­
ber.Id. 
Similarly, in the Mississippi state court system, the most densely populated counties, Harrison, 
Hines, Renken, Lauderdale and Jones Counties, have implemented a computer system which auto­
matically records judgments. Telephone Interview with Ronald Simms, Data Processing Manager of 
the Mississippi Supreme Court, Jackson, Mississippi (Sept. 30, 1994). The advantage of Missis­
sippi's computer system is that it is a common system used by the various counties, thus allowing 
cross-referencing throughout the state without the problems of conflicting systems. Id. 
In the New York state court system, the more densely populated regions have a computer sys­
tem which stores judgment liens in a database which can be accessed by anyone from the 
public-access terminals. Telephone Interview with Diane Thompson, Employee at the Data Process­
ing Office of Court Administration, Troy, New York (Sept. 21, 1994). 
Similarly, in the Iowa state court system, automation is currently being implemented through­
out the state. Telephone Interview with Larry Murphy, Director of the Court Administrator's Office, 
Des Moines, Iowa (Sept. 21, 1994). Thus far, thirty of the ninety-nine counties have installed a 
database of judgment liens which may be accessed by credit unions, banks, attorneys, private citi­
zens, etc. from public-access terminals. Id. Connection to personal computers, via modems, is also 
emerging. [d. 
The Alabama state court system is also implementing a statewide database for case processing 
and management. Telephone Interview with John O'Sullivan, Director of the Judicial Data Center of 
the Administrative Office of the Courts, Montgomery, Alabama (Sept. 29, 1994). Thus far, all but 
four states have implemented the system. [d. 
There are several state court systems, such as those in Maine and South Dakota, which have 
implemented statewide criminal docketing computer systems to manage the heavy caseloads, but 
have limited systems in the civil courts. Telephone Interview with Scott Clark, Purchasing Manager 
at the Administrative Office of the Courts, Portland, Maine (Sept. 30, 1994); Telephone Interview 
with Pamela R. Templeton, Planning and Systems Officer at the Unified Judicial System, Pierre, 
South Dakota (Sept. 30, 1994). 
In California, automation is being developed at many stages of a lawsuit: police officers carrying 
hand-held computers from which they issue citations; individuals paying fines or fees on interactive 
kiosks; attorneys electronically filing motions and documents with the court; criminal offenders being 
arraigned through interaction between the court and the prison via video camera; and evidence being 
stored and re-shown on computer to save time in presenting the original evidence twice. See Ander­
son et aI., supra, at 1761-69. However, in the area of judgment liens, the data is usually not re­
corded, despite the available technology. Telephone Interview with Peggy Hawkins, Superior Court 
Systems Specialist, Martinez, California (Sept. 30, 1994). In many of the less populated counties, 
there is no computer system at all and the information is stored manually. Id. 
There are still some states, such as Georgia, which have nearly no automation in their court 
systems, and the case processing and data storage is performed manually. Telephone Interview with 
Eric John, Director at the Council of Juvenile Court Judges, Marietta, Georgia (Sept. 29, 1994). 
The most common problems which keep states from implementing any type of automation in the 
court systems are a lack of state funding and political opinions which oppose innovation. For these 
reasons, it is necessary for a state to create an agency which can organize the effort to create a 
common system and solicit the necessary allocation of funds. 
Thus far, most court automation systems streamline the criminal systems and litigation process, 
and to some extent, the trial stage. This article merely suggests providing for a practical, effective 
method for the final stage of a lawsuit, the enforcement of a judgment. 
302 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 15:295 
courts throughout the state. It will not be necessary that these records 
al1 be stored in one place or all be contained in one database. Addi­
tional software could tie all the disparate systems together so that what 
may appear to be one search by the end user in fact will be a search of 
all databases throughout the state.so Any person could search these 
records in any courthouse throughout the state, or from any personal 
computer with a modem and the appropriate software. Unofficial 
records of judgments and U.C.c. security interests already are availa­
ble on LEXIS31 and Westlaw.32 
The availability of the virtual clerk's office will permit a substan­
tial revision of the rules regarding the priority of the claims of judg­
ment creditors. The proposed MJLA, which is set forth in the Appen­
dix, is designed to take advantage of that possibility and to illustrate 
how to deal with complications that may arise. 
A. Treatment of Various Types of Property 
J. Real Property 
Establishment of the virtual clerk's office would make it possible 
for a party to obtain judgment information by traveling to only one 
office and that office might very well be on her desk.s3 Therefore, there 
no longer would be any justification for limiting the scope of liens to 
the county of the judgment. All liens on real property therefore should 
be statewide. This would eliminate the delay and expense caused by the 
30. The fact that it may be necessary to harmonize different county and federal systems cre­
ated prior to the adoption of the system proposed in this article will not present insurmountable 
technical problems. Fortunately, the user's software can be designed to do all the work of searching 
each data base for the names requested and provide one report to the user. From the user's point of 
view it will appear as if she is accessing one central database. 
31. LEXIS provides unofficial judgment records for state courts in particular counties of Ari­
zona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Montana, Missouri, Nevada, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming. LEXIS 
provides U.C.C. filings for California, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania 
and Texas. 
32. Westlaw carries a Prentice Hall service which provides civil judgments from California, 
Hawaii, Nevada, Oregon, Washington and Texas. Westlaw provides U.C.C. filings from Arkansas, 
California, Colorado, Iowa, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New 
York, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah and Washington. 
33. Since it would be unfair to require all citizens to have modems and computers, MJLA 
requires that a terminal be available in all courthouses in the state. MJLA § I!. Even where states 
choose not to make the court records accessible to "dial up" searches, the reforms envisioned in 
MJLA are still achievable where the terminal in each courthouse can access all counties of the state. 
MJLA § 11. 
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creditor's need to be sure liens are filed in all counties in which a 
debtor may have property. 
2. "State Regulated" Tangible Personal Property 
The MJLA's effect on personal property will be even more signifi­
cant. First, as with liens on real property, judgment liens would attach 
to personal property throughout the state.34 As indicated previously, 
Alabama, Georgia, and Mississippi36 already provide for judgment 
liens to be liens on personal property in the county of the rendering 
court, and several states provide a mechanism for a statewide U.C.C.­
type filing of judgments which create liens on particular types of 
property.36 
Second, MJLA would make the lien arise upon judgment, not 
upon execution or delivery of a writ to the sheriff, as is the case in the 
vast majority of states. This would have a profound effect on secured 
creditors, purchasers and other judgment lienors. Although this would 
constitute a reversal of fortunes for the secured creditor, it is not ineq­
uitable to expect secured creditors to check the court filing system, 
since they already must check Article 9 filings. Purchase money se­
cured creditors who had advanced credit or money to enable the debtor 
to purchase property would be protected under MJLA, because the 
debtor would not own the property if it were not for the extension of 
credit which is secured by the property,37 and the judgment creditor 
has not relied on the debtor's ownership of the property. For the latter 
reason, the proposed protection of purchase money secured creditors is 
broader than that in the V.C.C. which requires prompt filing.38 
Basing priority to personal property on the date of judgment sig­
nificantly alters the relative rights of judgment creditors themselves by 
reversing the current rule in almost all states, which is to accord prior­
ity to the first creditor to execute on the property or the first creditor to 
34. Execution, the procedure for the actual sale of personal property to satisfy the claims of 
judgment lien creditors, would remain the same. It is conceded that the actual execution process may 
still be as arduous as it is currently. On the other hand, there are many attractive features which 
ease the procedural onus that the creditor currently endures while enforcing of a judgment, such as 
(l) automatic creation of the lien, thus eliminating the need to register the judgment with the clerk 
of the court; (2) development of a comprehensive lien on all property, thus eliminating the distinc­
tion in rules between real and personal property; and (3) establishment of immediate priority over 
subsequent creditors and purchasers. 
35. See supra note 17. 
36. See supra note 23. 
37. MJLA § 4(a)(iii). 
38. See V.C.C. §§ 9-301(2),9-312(3), (4) (1995). 
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get the writ to the sheriff. Presumably, the current rule rewards dili­
gence by creditors.89 It also rewards creditors who are more familiar 
with the whereabouts of the debtor's assets. Nevertheless, under the 
proposed statute the judgment creditor will still have an incentive to be 
diligent. for two reasons. First, post judgment interest added to the debt 
does not sufficiently reward the creditor for the delay in collection.40 
Second, the property might disappear or depreciate. Junior judgment 
creditors will also have an incentive to inform senior creditors of prop­
erty because the junior judgment creditor then will be closer to satis­
faction of her judgment. Moreover, this is supported by the V.C.c., 
which dictates a similar result for competing security interests."l 
Along with secured creditors and judgment creditors, third parties 
who may purchase or lease property from the debtor will also be ef­
fected by the creation of the judgment lien on personal property!2 
When the law regarding liens on personal property developed, it may 
have been considered too onerous a burden on third parties to make 
their right to personal property depend on records in a courthouse in 
the county seat!8 But all states now impose that burden on third par­
ties through the use of the V.C.C. filing system for personal property. 
Obviously there are situations where it would be unfair to third parties 
to requir~ such a search. 
Yet, the ability to make judgment lien searches easily available at 
the virtual clerk's office should be kept in mind in distinguishing those 
third parties who genuinely deserve protection and those who do not. 
For example, it will never be appropriate to expect a consumer pur­
chaser to conduct a judgment lien search, but it would be appropriate 
for those engaging in large transactions and for business purchasers to 
do so. MJLA illustrates how those exceptions can be made. For exam­
ple, any consumer purchase would be excluded!4 Also, all business 
39. WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND & PIERRE R. LOISEAUX. DEBTOR CREDITOR RELATIONS 53-54 
(2d ed. 1979). 
40. See supra note 3. 
41. V.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a) (1995). 
42. Although not a purchaser, in many states an "artisan" who retains possession of the 
debtor's property has priority over previously perfected security interests. It would be unfair to ex­
pect the repairer of equipment or the dry cleaner to conduct a search for a possible financing state­
ment. Moreover, the repair presumably adds value to the property at least sufficient to cover the cost 
of repair. For these reasons, the proposed judgment lien on personal property also should be subject 
to artisan's liens. MJLA § 4(a)(vii). 
43. HAWKLAND & LOISEAUX, supra note 39. 
44. MJLA §§ 4(a)(ii) + I (g)(v). 
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purchases for less than $5,000 would be protected.411 Where businesses 
make purchases of a greater amount, even if purchasing from a 
merchant who deals in goods of the kind, it is fair that they either 
check the records or take the risk that the property is subject to a lien. 
Similarly, the proposed statute provides protection for purchasers of 
property for which state law provides a filing system for all transfers 
(as opposed to the V.C.C. filing system which is only for security inter­
ests).46 The proposed statute distinguishes between consumer purchases 
of such property47 and business purchasers who are only protected 
where the purchase is for less than $5,000.48 Finally, because the pro­
posed statute treats lessees of property as purchasers, it provides simi­
lar protections and risks for lessees.49 Despite making the above excep­
tions from the scope of the judgment lien, the lien would not be 
avoidable by the trustee or debtor in possession in bankruptcy since the 
lien is superior to subsequent judgment liens.IIO 
The creation of a judgment lien on personal property and tbe es­
tablishment of an easily accessible recording system would aid creditors 
in preventing debtors from selling and hypothecating property, and 
would reward the first creditors to proceed against the debtor. In addi­
tion, the proposed system helps those debtors who can overcome short 
term financial distress by making it easier for creditors who have judg­
ments to negotiate with debtors while at the same time preserving their 
priority. Currently that is not possible: the creditor takes some risk if, 
to give the debtor a chance to satisfy the judgment voluntarily, the 
creditor does not have the property seized quickly. Where the creditor 
refrains from selling property, subsequent creditors may be able to strip 
45. MJLA §§ 4(a)(ii) & I (g)(i). Note that the protection provided the judgment lien creditor 
under my proposal is greater than that provided the secured creditor under V.C.C. § 9·307. This is 
only the case where the sale is a buyer in the ordinary course and a commercial purchase is involved. 
The reason for the difference is that the secured creditor who voluntarily deals with a merchant can 
be expected to monitor the merchant's sales and probably wants the merchant to be able to continue 
selling inventory. However, the judgment lien creditor may not be aware of the debtor's business and 
probably does not want the debtor to continue disposing of property. The judgment lien creditor 
wants to get the debtor's attention. If large commercial purchasers will not buy from the debtor, the 
debtor is more likely to pay to the judgment creditor. 
46. MJLA §§ 4(a)(ii) & 1 (g)(iii) & (iv). 
47. MJLA §§ 4 & I (g)(ii). 
48. MJLA §§ 4(a)(ii) & l(g)(iii). 
49. The definition of "buy" includes leasing. MJLA § I(a). 
50. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1), (2) (1988); MJLA § 4. 
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the original creditor of priority due to the failure to execute promptly. 51 
MJLA will allow judgment creditors to maintain priority to personal 
property in the same way that judgment lien creditors can for real 
property, and secured creditors can for both real and personal property. 
3. Federally Regulated Tangible Personal Property: Aircraft 
Although the proposed statute purports to govern transfers of title 
of all tangible personal property, it cannot conflict with federal law to 
the extent that it controls title to such property. For example, with re­
gard to airplanes, federal law provides: 
Until a conveyance, lease, or instrument executed for security pur­
poses that may be recorded under section 44107(a)(1) or (2) of this title 
is filed for recording, the conveyance, lease, or instrument is valid only 
against­
(1) the person making the conveyance, lease, or instrument; 
(2) that person's heirs and devisees; and 
(3) a person having actual notice of the conveyance, lease, or 
instrument.1S2 
The United States Supreme Court has held that a similar provi­
sion prohibits all transfers of title to aircraft from having validity 
against third parties unless a written instrument memorialized the 
transfer and has been recorded with the Federal Aviation Administra­
tion.58 Nevertheless, once instruments are recorded, state law rules de­
termine the priorities among competing recorded interests.54 This ap­
parent contradiction can be understood by viewing the recording 
51. HAWKLAND & LOlSllAUX, supra note 39; Century Pipe Supply Co. v. Empire Factors 
Corp., 153 N.E.2d 298, 302 (Ill. App. Ct. 1958); Robinson v. Wright, 9 P.2d 618 (CoL 1932); see 
Ill. Inc. v. Margolis, 296 A.2d 412 (Md. 1972), and the cases referred to therein. 
52. 49 U.s.C. 44108 (1995). 
53. Philko Aviation, Inc. v. Shacket, 402 U.S. 406 (1983). The prior statute read: "No con­
veyance or instrument ... shall be valid. . . against any person. . . until such conveyance or other 
instrument is filed for recordation in the office of the [Federal Aviation Administration]." 49 U.S.C. 
§ 1403 (1988). 
54. Phi/ko, 402 U.S. at 412-13. ("We are inclined to agree with this ....); South Shore 
Bank v. Tony Mat, Inc., 712 F.2d 896 (3d Cir. 1983). "No conveyance or instrument ... shall be 
valid . . . against any person . . . until such conveyance or other instrument is filed for recordation 
in the office of the [Federal Aviation Administration]." This rule appears to be more explicitly stated 
in the revised statute. 49 U.s.C. § 44108(c): The validity of a conveyance, lease, or instrument that 
may be recorded under § 44107 of this title is subject to the laws of the State, the District of 
Columbia, or the territory or possession of the United States at which the conveyance, lease, or 
instrument is delivered, regardless of the place at which the subject of the conveyance, lease, or 
instrument is located or delivered. If the conveyance, lease, or instrument specifies the place at which 
delivery is intended, it is presumed that the conveyance, lease, or instrument was delivered at the 
specified place. 
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system as a congressional reaction to the problems created by the 
highly mobile nature of aircraft. Absent a single filing location, pur­
chasers and secured parties would need to file in many jurisdictions to 
perfect their interests and would need to make a title search in all 
states to be certain there was no prior recorded interest.55 Therefore, 
Congress created a central filing system, leaving the effect of the filing 
to the states.56 
The following hypothetical illustrates the consequences. C obtains 
a judgment against D on January 1. C has the writ of execution (or 
other appropriate document) delivered to the sheriff on January 15. On 
February 1, S obtains a security interest in D's airplane and records 
the security interest with the FAA. On February 15, the sheriff seizes 
D's airplane based on Cs writ. C subsequently has some documentation 
establishing the seizure filed with FAA. 
In a state where the execution lien arises on the date that the writ 
is given to the sheriff, C will probably defeat S. This result is not guar­
anteed. A court could hold that the federal filing system controls both 
recordation and priorities.57 In that case, the result would be the same 
as in the states where the execution lien arises upon attachment. But, 
assuming the priority is based on state law, the judgment creditor's 
priority is still dependent upon getting the writ to the sheriff and locat­
ing the plane prior to the expiration of the writ. Moreover, as a result 
of the delay in recordation, even if C eventually wins, others (such as 
S) may have dealt with D in reliance on the lack of any recordation. 
This is obviously bad for S, but it is also bad for C. Cs ability to 
convey good title is in question and C will incur expenses defending 
that title. In a state where the execution lien arises upon attachment, 
the answer is clearer: C will be defeated by S. In those states which 
provide for the U.C.C.-type filing of judgment liens, the statutes do not 
provide for recording in federal filing systems and are expressly limited 
to the types of property for which state filings are appropriate.58 
The MJLA helps the judgment creditor. First, the lien arises upon 
judgment. It is not necessary first to locate a plane or the sheriff. 
55. Gary Aircraft Corp. v. General Dynamics Corp., 681 F.2d 365, 370 (5th Cir. 1982). 
56. [d. at 372. 
57. At least one case has held that the federal statute controls priorities. In re Cone, 11 B.R. 
925 (Bankr. D. Fla. 1981). That case was criticized in Gary Aircraft Corp. v. General Dynamics 
Corp., 681 F.2d 365, 369 n.3 (5th Cir. 1982). Cone was decided prior to Phi/ko, 402 U.S. at 406; 
but note the rather weak language of Phi/ko. 
58. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 697.530 (West 1987 & Supp. 1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 52-355a (West 1991); ME. REV. STAT tit. 14, § 46S1-A (West Supp. 1994), 
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Rather, the notice (in the above hypothetical) could be filed with the 
FAA as early as January 2. Despite the fact that the rules for transfer 
may require actions taken outside the state, the plane clearly is within 
the definition of property,69 and the proposed statute provides for a doc­
ument which can be filed to record the transfer.eo Upon the Secretary's 
receiving of the application for registration, the lien would become a 
valid transfer.e1 
4. Intangible Property: Securities 
Intangible personal property has always presented somewhat of a 
problem for judgment creditors. Although state statutes indicate that 
all personal property is subject to enforcement, it is not always clear 
how an executing officer seizes such property.e2 Often creditors must 
resort to a supplementary procedure to obtain control over such prop­
erty.es Yet in contradistinction to the times when the law of judicial 
liens originated, intangible personal property is often the most signifi­
59. MJLA § I (I). 
60. MJLA § 9. The judgment creditor could request that this order be entered at the same 
time as the judgment. 
61. Farina v. South Shore Bank, 25 B.R. 411 (Bankr. D. Me. 1982). 
62. Some intangibles (such as negotiable warehouse receipts, negotiable instruments, and se­
curities) have become so identified with a writing that seizure of the paper itself has long constituted 
seizure of the obligation it memorializes. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 7-602 (warehouse receipts). With the 
exception of the treatment of some transfers of certificated securities, MJLA respects transfers of 
those documents despite the presence of the lien. MJLA § 1 (g) (vii). 
63. See. e.g., MD. R 2-651; COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-52-102(4)(b) (West 1989 & Supp. 
1994) ("All goods and chattels, lands, tenements, and real estate ... are liable to sale on execu­
tion."). Stepnowski, supra note 2, at 43-52. 
In California "all property of the judgment debtor is subject to enforcement of a money judg­
ment." CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 695.010 (West 1987). And "all property that is subject to enforce­
ment of a money judgment ... is subject to levy under a writ of execution." CAL CIV. PROC. CODE 
§ 699.710 (West 1987). The judgment creditor may seek a court order requiring the judgment 
debtor to turn over "evidence of title to property." CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 699.040 (West 1987). 
The judgment creditor may institute an examination proceeding. ld. § 708.110. Service upon the 
judgment debtor of the order to attend the procedure "creates a lien on the personal property of the 
judgment for a period of one year from the date of the order unless extended or sooner terminated 
by the court." CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 708.110 (West 1987 & Supp. 1995). At the conclusion of 
the proceeding the judge may order that the judgment debtor's interest in the property be applied 
toward the satisfaction of the judgment. "Such an order creates a lien on the property. . .." CAL. 
CIV. PROC. CODE § 708.205 (West 1987). A judgment creditor may also move for the appointment 
of a receiver. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 564 (West 1987 & Supp. 1995). The receiver's powers in­
clude the power "to make transfers." CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 568 (West 1987). Although the 
availability of other remedies does not, in and of itself, preclude tbe use of a receivership, the trial 
court "must consider the availability and efficacy of other remedies in determining the whether to 
employ the extraordinary remedy of a receivership." City & County of San Francisco v. Daley, 20 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 256, 263 (Cl. App. 1st Dis!., 1993). 
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cant property which the judgment debtor owns. The major change 
worked by the proposed statute is the complete separation of the proce­
dure for actually selling the property from the determination of the 
priority of the various parties with interests in the property. The pro­
posed statute makes no change in the former, but, with regard to the 
latter, the MJLA makes clear that the judgment creditor's priority is 
based on the date of judgment. Since intangible property is probably 
the most difficult property to identify and to compel transfer, the pro­
posed judgment creditor's lien would protect the creditor from the 
debtor's ability to transfer or hypothecate such property. Other parties 
dealing with the debtor would know that their interests are at risk. 
However, two types of property deserve special attention: investment 
securities and intangible property governed by federal law. 
Investment securities are "share[s], participation, or other inter­
est [s] in. . . property or an enterprise of an issuer"64 and the transfers 
of securities are governed by Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code.6l1 Corporate stock, for example, is an investment security gov­
erned by Article 8. Corporate securities can be either certificated or 
uncertificated. Article 8 requires seizure of the stock certificate for cer­
tificated securities and legal process in the issuer's office for uncertifi­
cated securities in order for creditors to obtain any interest in such 
securities.66 In the MJLA, I propose leaving the current rule in place 
with regard to conflicts between buyers of securities and judgment lien 
creditors. With regard to conflicts between parties claiming a security 
interest in securities and judgment lien creditors, I propose that the 
statewide filing system be given effect for un certificated securities. 
With regard to conflicts between various judgment lien creditors, I pro­
pose that the filing system be given effect for both certificated and un­
certificated securities. 
64. u.c.c. § 8-102 (1995). 
65. The vast majority of states, including the leading corporate states of Delaware, New York 
and California have adopted the revised version of Article 8 which is discussed in this article. See 2C 
UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 278-79 (1991). In 1994, the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws adopted a revised U.C.C. 2C UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 30 (1991 & Supp. 
1995). Few states have adopted the revisions. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 47-8101 to -8511 (Supp. 
1995); 1995 Ark. Acts 425; Idaho Code §§ 28-8-101 to -511 (1995); 1991 Ill. Legis. Servo P.A. 89­
364 (West); 1995 Ind. Legis. Servo 152-1986 (West) (effective July 1, 1996); 1995 La. Sess. Law 
Servo 884 (West); 1995 Minn. Sess. Law Servo 194 (West); 1995 Neb. Laws 97; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 
12A, § 8-101 to -511 (Supp. 1995); Or. Rev. Stat. § 78.1010 to .S110 (Supp. 1995); 1995 Tex. Sess. 
Law Servo 962 (Vernon); 1995 Wash. Legis. Servo 48 (West); W. Va. Code § 46-8-101 to -51l 
(Supp. 1995. 
66. U.C.C. § 8-317(1) (1991) (§ 8-112 of Revised U.C.C.). 
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Buyers. The rule requiring seizure of the stock certificate for cer­
tificated securities and legal process in the issuer's office for uncertifi­
cated securities, in order for judgment creditors to obtain any interest 
in such securities, is primarily designed for the protection of purchas­
ers.1I7 The rule with regard to buyers is sound, particularly given the 
ease with which debtors and securities can cross state lines.lls 
Secured Creditors. With regard to the rights of secured parties, 
the current rule certainly seems justified in the case of certificated se­
curities. Secured creditors must obtain possessionll9 or obtain a signed 
security agreement and give value70 in order to obtain a security inter­
est in certificated securities; but for the security interest to be perfected 
they must ordinarily obtain possession.71 No filing is necessary to per­
fect the security interest.72 With regard to uncertificated securities 
there are a variety of ways to obtain a security interest including the 
"registered pledge," in which notice of the assignment is given to the 
issuer.73 The structure of the revised version of Article 8, particularly 
with respect to uncertificated securities, does not provide a great deal of 
protection for those who contemplate taking a security interest.74 Nev­
ertheless, the lien creditor can only obtain a lien on the security by 
legal process at the issuer's chief executive office in the United States.75 
If the judgment is in a state other than the one where that office is 
situated, then a legal proceeding must be instituted in the office state. 
Therefore, with respect to certificated and uncertificated securities, 
the MJLA could revise priorities by making secured creditors subject 
to judgment liens which arise prior to the attachment of the security 
interest. Secured creditors certainly can be expected to search for such 
liens. As indicated previously, the primary purpose behind the restric­
tions placed on lien creditors was to protect purchasers, not secured 
creditors. Given that a better argument can be made for continuing the 
approach of Article 8 with regard to certificated securities rather than 
uncertificated securities, I am proposing that the MJLA retain the Ar­
67. 2C VNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 427 (1991). 
68. The buyer is protected as a "protected purchaser" under MJLA §§ 1 (g)(vii), 4(a)(ii). 
69. V.C.C. § 8-313(1)(a) (1991) (§ 8·301(a)(I) of Revised V.C.C.). 
70. V.C.C. § 8·313(1)(i) (1991) (§ 9·203(1) of Revised V.C.C.). 
71. V.C.C. § 8·321(2) (1991) (§ 9·115 (4) of Revised V.C.C.). 
72. V.C.C. § 8-321(3)(a) (1991) (§ 9-115(4)(6) of Revised V.C.C.). 
73. V.C.C. § 8·108 (1991). See §§ 9·203,9·301, 9·303, 9·304, 9·305, 9-306, 9·309, and 9­
312 of Revised V.C.C. 
74. See ELDON H. REILEY. GUIDEBOOK TO SECURITY INTEREST IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 
§ 14.08[3][e] (1994). 
75. V.C.C. § 8·317 (1991) (§ 8-112 of Revised V.C.C.). 
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tide 8 approach for the former,7s but substitute an approach similar to 
that used with regard to aircraft for uncertificated securities. Specifi­
cally, MJLA requires that for purposes of uncertificated securities, a 
judgment lien could defeat a secured creditor if the judgment lien is 
recorded in the statewide judgment lien filing system of the state of the 
principal office of the issuer.77 It is not particularly burdensome to ex­
pect secured creditors, unlike buyers, to check state filing systems. Also 
the judgment lien creditor, unlike the secured creditor, is entitled to a 
lien on all securities in which the judgment debtor has an interest. The 
burden is then on the debtor to satisfy the judgment in order to main­
tain good title to all securities. In order to avoid difficulties caused by 
the fact that title to securities is controlled by the state of the issuer, 
the reform proposed in the MJLA is designed to be effective only for 
securities issued by corporations in states which have adopted the 
MJLA.7S 
Judgment Creditors. While the proposed MJLA makes changes 
only in the priorities of the judgment lien creditor vis-a-vis the secured 
creditor with regard to uncertificated securities, it changes the rules for 
priorities of the judgment lien creditor vis-a-vis other judgment lien 
creditors for both certificated and uncertificated securities. Unlike the 
purchaser or the secured creditor, the judgment lien creditor does not 
rely on the debtor owning specific securities when engaging in transac­
tions with the debtor. The tort victim, for example, does not lie down in 
front of the debtor's truck because the debtor had Microsoft stock in 
her portfolio. Similarly, the supplier or unsecured lender does not rely 
on specific securities. Therefore, there is no need to ground their prior­
ity on the basis of which judgment creditor had given notice to the 
issuer of the securities or had possession of the securities. 
Basing the judgment lien creditor's priority on the date of judg­
ment (or date of filing in the state system) has two significant addi­
tional advantages for the judgment lien creditor. First, the judgment 
lien creditor will be able to defeat a subsequent bankruptcy trustee or 
debtor in possession in bankruptcy. The MJLA judgment lien creditor 
would not be vulnerable to lien avoidance in bankruptcy because her 
76. MJLA § 4(a)(ix). 
77. MJLA § 4(a)(x). Section 9 provides the procedure for the judgment creditor to obtain the 
document to file. Note that although § 9(c) provides for a hearing to obtain the order that is filed in 
the sister state, such an order could be requested and issued with the judgment. The requirement of 
the order will allow the court, if requested at the time of judgment or at a later date, to specify 
specific securities of which the judgment creditor may be aware. 
78. MJLA § 4(x)(B)(II). 
312 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 15:295 
lien could not be defeated by another judicial lien creditor.79 The sec­
ond major advantage for the judicial lien on securities under MJLA is 
that a subsequently filed federal tax lien would be subject to the judg­
ment lien creditor.SO 
5. Intangible Property: Intellectual Property 
Another financially significant form of intangible personal prop­
erty is intellectual property: patents, trademarks and copyrights. Intel­
lectual property is largely governed by federal law. 
Originally, in the case of intellectual property, a court would not 
compel the execution of copyrights or patents because of the strong 
public policy favoring the promotion of artists' and inventors' ingenuity 
took precedence over creditors' rights.sl Patents and copyrights were 
also afforded "immunity" against creditors, because of their intangible 
nature.S2 However, during the past century, courts have begun to con­
sider creditors' rights more seriously and to compel involuntary trans­
fers of intellectual property.S3 Ownership rights must be transferred in 
79. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1), (2) (1988). 
80. 26 U.S.C. § 6323 (a) (1988). For purposes of the tax lien act a judgment lien is not 
perfected (and therefore superior to the tax lien) unless the "identity of the lienor, the property 
subject to the lien, and the amount of the lien are established." 26 C.F.R. § 301.6323(h) (1988). 
This restates the "choateness" doctrine which had been used to restrict the liens which had priority 
over the I.R.S. The MJLA lien clearly meets the first and third parts of the test but there could be a 
question regarding the second since the lien applies to all property of the debtor not just specific 
items of property. However, the one federal court which has dealt with this issue has concluded that 
such a lien is choate for these purposes. Asher v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 22, 26 (N.D. Ill. 
1976), affd, 570 F.2d 682 (7th Cif. 1978). Moreover, the regulations support that conclusion. The 
regulations require that with regard to real property only that the judgment lien must be recorded so 
as to be superior to all third parties. But that requirement does not apply to personal property. The 
only part of the regulation relevant to personal property states that, "If under local law levy or 
seizure is necessary before a judgment lien becomes effective against third parties acquiring liens on 
personal property, then a judgment lien under such local law is not perfected until levy or seizure of 
the personal property involved." 26 C.F.R. § 301.6323(h) (1988) (emphasis added). It might be 
argued that the term "lien" applies to secured creditors and hence the protection of secured creditors 
with regard to certificated securities would jeopardize the judgment lien's priority as to certificated 
securities. "Lien," however, is not defined in the regulations, but also is not used to describe security 
interests. 
81. See Ager v. Murray, 105 U.S. 126 (1881) (holding property without body may not be 
executed upon by marshall or sheriff, but creditor may be able to reach property through a bill of 
equity). 
82. Lieurance, supra note 26. 
83. See Sanders v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 292 U.S. 190 (1934) (holding creditors may 
garnish choices in action and other intangibles). See also McClaskey v. Harbison-Walker Refracto­
ries Co., 138 F.2d 493 (3d Cir. 1943) (holding debtors' intellectual property could be transferred to 
creditors by means of fieri facias); Platt & Munk Co. v. Republic Graphics, Inc., 315 F.2d 847 (2d 
Cir. 1963) (holding the "first sale" that terminates the exclusive right of a patent or copyright holder 
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accordance with federal law in the case of copyrights,84 patents85 and 
trademarks.86 Federal law regarding the transfer of interests in such 
property would preempt state lien statutes. 
The provision of the Copyright Act of 1976 which provides for 
transfers of ownership rights to a copyright does not explicitly author­
ize the creation ofjudicialliens on copyrights, but it does provide that 
interests in a copyright may be transferred by "operation of law."87 
This indicates that copyrights are susceptible to the entire range of 
state creditor remedies.88 
The Patent Act provides only for transfer of ownership of a patent 
by the applicant, patentee, his assigns, or legal representatives by 
means of an "instrument in writing."89 However, the term "legal repre­
sentatives" has been interpreted to include a court appointed officer.90 
Further, like the transfer provision for copyrights, the patent transfer 
section also explicitly refers to patents as personal property,91 thus im­
plying the applicability to state lien laws. 
Trademarks,s2 unlike patents and copyrights, hold no inherent 
value in and of themselves.93 Instead, the significance associated with a 
trademark is dependent upon the business, service, or product with 
which it is associated.94 Therefore, the provision dealing with the as­
signment of trademarks, § 1060 of the Lanham Act, the federal trade­
mark statute, allows for the assignment of a trademark only "with the 
goodwill of the business in which the mark is used, or with that part of 
need not be truly voluntary, but can be reasonably compelled by a court); Lantern Press, Inc. v. 
American Publishers Co., 419 F. Supp. 1267 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (holding a compulsory transfer may 
be considered a "lawful transfer" if compelled by a court). Cj Baltimore & O.R.R. Co. v. Hostetter, 
240 U.S. 620 (1916). 
84. 17 U.S.C. §§ 201, 205 (1988). 
85. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1988). 
86. 15 U.S.c. § 1060 (1988). 
87. 17 U.s.C. § 201{d) (1988). 
88. Also, because transfer by inheritance is explicitly referred to, the only other meaning that 
"operation of law" could have is transfer by bankruptcy or judicial lien. That section also refers to 
copyrights as personal property which under most state lien statutes, would be subject to execution. 
Moreover, § 201 (e) deals with involuntary transfers through Title 11 bankruptcy proceedings which 
makes it apparent that the drafters of the Act considered the allowance of court-compelled transfers 
for the benefit of debtors. 
89. 35 U.S.c. § 261 (1988). 
90. McClaskey v. Harbison-Walker Refractories Co., 138 F.2d 493, 500 (3d Cif. 1943). 
91. 35 U.s.C. § 261. 
92. The discussion also includes "service marks." 
93. VISA, U.S.A., Inc. v. Birmingham Trust Nat'j Bank, 696 F.2d 1371, 1375 (Fed. CiL 
1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 826 (1983). 
94. [d. 
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the goodwill of the business connected with the use of and symbolized 
by the mark."91S Most states also have enacted their own trademark 
laws. If there is conflict between the transfer provisions of the federal 
and state laws, federal law preempts the state law. As a result, the 
state transfer provisions are almost identical to the Lanham Act.96 Like 
patents, the transfer of trademarks also must be by an "instrument in 
writing duly executed."97 
Although most states provide that "all personal property" is sub­
ject to execution, the intangible nature of intellectual property renders 
it impossible for a sheriff to seize and sell.98 Seizure and sale of the 
object (for example a book) does not constitute sale of the copyright or 
patent.99 Therefore the primary method for obtaining a lien on personal 
property is not really available in the case of intellectual property. The 
judgment creditor must resort to a procedure whereby the court assists 
the creditor in obtaining control over the property. Such "supplemen­
tary procedures" may involve compelling the debtor to execute a trans­
fer or appointing a receiver to execute such a transfer. loo These may be 
difficult to obtain because of preliminary equitable requirements, per­
sonal jurisdictional requirements, and substantive additional require­
ments, such as proof of fraud. 
The question is presented, therefore, whether a lien which arises 
on judgment alone, such as proposed in this article, could attach to 
federally established intellectual property, and whether such a lien 
could bind future purchasers, secured parties, and unsecured creditors. 
Although a sheriff can not seize the intellectual property, a court can 
convey the authority to do so to an appropriate officer. lOl Since under 
MJLA the judgment creates a lien on all personal property, the MJLA 
is therefore infusing in the money judgment a court ordered seizure of 
an' interest in the debtor's intellectual property. This, coupled with the 
95. 15 U.S.C. § 1060 (1963) (amended 1988) (emphasis added). 
96. See generally CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 14260 (West 1987); MD. CODE ANN., Bus. 
REG. § 1-411 (1984); NY GEN. Bus. LAW § 365 (McKinney 1984). 
97. NY GEN. Bus. LAW § 365 (McKinney 1984). 
98. See Farina, 25 B.R. at 41 L 
99. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C § 202 (1988). Accord Stephens v. Cady, 55 U.s. (14 
How.) 318 (1852) (sale of engraving at execution sale does not convey copyright); Kingsrow Enter., 
Inc. v. Metromedia, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (execution sale of films and copyright 
certificates conveys no rights in copyrights). In this way, intellectual property is distinguished from 
those intangibles where seizure of the writing evidencing the property right constitutes seizure of the 
obligation itself. See supra note 62. 
100. See Farina, 25 B.R. at 411. 
101. See Ager, 105 U.s. at 132 (decree appointing trustee to execute assignment was within 
the chancery powers of the court). 
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copyright act's provision for the transfer of the rights by "operation of 
law," indicates that the judgment lien provided for in the MJLA un­
doubtedly encompasses any rights in copyright which the debtor has. 
Since the Patent Act only provides for transfers in writing, the argu­
ment for the applicability of the judgment lien is not as clear. Never­
theless, the statute's explicit statement that patents have the attributes 
of "personal property" could be argued to indicate that they are also 
subject to personal property rules of the various states to the extent 
they do not conflict with the federal statute.102 
Trademarks present the most troublesome case for applicability of 
the judgment lien. The statute requires written assignments and does 
not contain the additional language, as does the patent statute, regard­
ing trademarks having the attributes of property rights. The proposed 
treatment of intellectual property in the MJLA is as follows: Copy­
rights and patents would be treated differently than trademarks. With 
regard to copyrights and patents, the lien arises with the judgment. 
That lien, however, is subject to the priority rules contained in the rele­
vant statutes103 and those statutes require a recordation of the transfers 
with the Register of Copyrights or Patent and Trademarks Office. 
Therefore, MJLA provides a mechanism for the judgment creditor to 
obtain a court order that can be filed in the appropriate office.104 This 
102. Paul Heald, Resolving Priority Disputes in Intellectual Property Collateral. 1 J. INTELL. 
PROP. L. 135, 140-41 (1993). 
103. With regard to copyrights, the statute provides that: 
Priority Between Conflicting Transfers - As between two conflicting transfers, the one exe­
cuted first prevails if it is recorded, in the manner required to give constructive notice under 
subsection (c), within one month after its execution in the United States or within two 
months after its execution outside the United States, or at any time before recordation in 
such manner of the later transfer. Otherwise the later transfer prevails if recorded first in 
such manner, and if taken in good faith, for valuable consideration or on the basis of a bind­
ing promise to pay royalties, and without notice of the earlier transfer. 
17 u.s.C. § 20S(d) (1988). 
With regard to patents, the statute provides that: 
An assignment, grant or conveyance shall be void as against any subsequent purchaser or 
mortgagee for a valuable consideration, without notice, unless it is recorded in the Patent and 
Trademark Office within three months from its date or prior to the date of such subsequent 
purchase or mortgage. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1988). 
104. MJLA § 9. The requirements of a court order recognize the inherent differences between 
the intangible property involved and the tangible property governed by current state procedures. 
Since there is no point at which the debtor can actually see the property leaving her control and 
coming under the jurisdiction of the court, the procedure provides a way to be sure that the debtor 
has appropriate notice and an opportunity to contest the seizure. That order can be requested and 
issued along with the money judgment itself. See supra note 77. Moreover, the procedure provides 
the creditor with an appropriate document that can be filed in the proper federal office. Finally, the 
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order, combined with the fact that a lien arises on judgment, overcomes 
the dual problem of needing a transfer to record and needing a writing 
evidencing that transfer. To the extent that a creditor has priority 
under the federal statute, the creditor would have priority under 
MJLA. Essentially, once the order is filed, the judgment creditor would 
have priority over all subsequent purchasers and secured creditors. The 
result would be different with regard to judgment lien creditors depend­
ing upon whether a patent or copyright was involved. In the case of 
copyrights, the language of the copyright act that the filing require­
ment protects all "transferees" (since judgment lien creditors are trans­
ferees) means that the first judgment lien creditor to file would have 
priority.IOIi Since the relevant patent provision only protects purchasers 
and mortgagees,106 the lien established by MJLA on patents would 
have priority over all subsequent judgment lien creditors without recor­
dation in the federal office.107 
The consequence of this is illustrated by the following hypotheti­
cal. D has a patent on a process for cold fusion. On January 1, X ob­
tains a judgment against D in state A (which has a statute similar to 
MJLA). On January 2, Yobtains a judgment against D in state B 
(which has a statute similar to MJLA). On January 3, Y records at the 
patent office. On January 4, X records at the patent office. X's lien 
would have priority. But note that if Y sells D's patent to Z at an exe­
cution sale, prior to the time X records, Z (as a purchaser) would pre­
vail. Since the patent statute provides X a three month grace period 
from the date of conveyance, if the sale to Z took place on February 1 
and X records her lien March 25, X would prevai1.108 
Since a trademark has no real independent value, but is a symbol 
of a company's goodwill,Io9 and cannot be assigned "in gross,"110 the 
proposed statute provides that the lien does not arise until the trade-
procedure gives the creditor a way of assuring both the sheriff and the buyers that an appropriate 
and meaningful sale is taking place. 
105. 17 U.S.C. § 205(d), (e) (1988). 
106. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1988). 
107. Note that MJLA § 4(a)(xii) only refers to purchasers and mortgagees. 
108. MJLA § 4(a)(xii). 
109. VISA, U.S.A., 696 F.2d at 1375. 
110. Id. An assignment "in gross" is one where a trademark owner attempts to transfer his 
rights in the trademark in and of itself, without any transfer of the business which the trademark 
represents. However, an exception to this rule does exist. If the trademark is transferred to someone 
whose product and/or services are sufficiently similar to those of the trademark owner's business, 
and the use by the transferee will not mislead consumers of the established associations of the trade­
mark, then the transfer will be upheld. Id. at 1375-76. See also Marshak v. Green, 746 F.2d 927 (2d 
Cir. 1984). 
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mark is sold at an execution sale.1l1 By adopting this procedure, MJLA 
provides the creditor with a practical method to satisfy its judgment 
where the debtor owns intellectual property. The statute nonetheless 
respects the vagaries of federal law which controls and affords purchas­
ers and secured parties with appropriate notice. 
B. Foreign Judgments 
The local federal court. Judgments of the federal district courts 
sitting in the state will be subject to the proposed system only if the 
state law treats those judgments exactly like state court judgments.ll2 
Two situations must be considered. The first is where the federal dis­
trict court judgments are computer searchable in a way consistent with 
those of the state court. In such a case, MJLA need only provide that 
the federal court judgments be treated exactly like state court judg­
ments.1l8 The second is where federal district court judgments are not 
searchable in a way consistent with the MJLA. The question arises as 
to what extent the state statute can make the lien of the federal court 
in some way dependent on the federal court clerk or the judgment cred­
itor filing some notice of the judgment in the state system. Since 
MJLA requires the state clerk to enter the data into a searchable 
database,114 the requirement that the federal court clerk do the same 
would seem to fit within the statutory prescription that whenever a 
state court judgment must be recorded in a particular manner, a simi­
lar requirement applies to federal judgments if the state authorizes the 
111. MJLA § 4(a) (xiii). 
112. The United States Code provides that: 
Every judgment rendered by a district court within a State shall be a lien on the property 
located in such State in the same manner, to the same extent and under the same conditions 
as a judgment of a court of general jurisdiction in such State, and shall cease to be a lien in 
the same manner and time. This section does not apply to judgments entered in favor of the 
United States. Whenever the law of any State requires a judgment of a State court to be 
registered, recorded, docketed or indexed, or any other act to be done, in a particular manner, 
or in a certain office or county or parish before such lien attaches, such requirements shall 
apply only if the law of such State authorizes the judgment of a court of the United States to 
be registered, recorded, docketed, indexed or otherwise conformed to rules and requirements 
relating to judgments of the courts of the State. 
28 U.S.C. § 1962 (1988) (emphasis added). 
113. MJLA § 2(b) (Alternative A). Since the federal statute provides that judgments are 
liens "under the same conditions" and "cease to be a lien in the same manner and time" as state 
court judgments, all of the MJLA provisions regarding the requirements contained in MJLA § 3 
would be applicable to federal court judgments. It should be noted that Federal Courts are rapidly 
automating and making docket searches available through the PACER system. 
114. MJLA § lOeb). 
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recording.ll& That "requirement" is contained in Alternative B of 
MJLA section 2(b).116 
Sister state judgments. States must give the judgments of the 
courts of sister states "full faith and credit."117 If the state which en­
acts MJLA recognizes the sister state judgment through the procedure 
of the judgment creditor suing on the judgment, the judgment creditor 
will obtain a lien by virtue of the judgment on the judgment.H8 Many 
states have adopted the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments 
Act, which replaces the procedure of suing on the judgment with the 
procedure of merely recording judgments. lUI In those states, the lan­
guage of that statute to the effect that the "clerk shall treat the judg­
ment in the same manner" as a judgment of the state court,120 requires 
that the clerk should record the foreign judgment in accordance with 
MJLA section 10. The language that the filed judgment has the same 
effect of a judgment of the state in which it is filed l2l leads to the result 
that the lien provided for in MJLA section 2(a) arises. Nevertheless, 
since a state court judgment would never actually be rendered, section 
8(b) is added to be sure that the intent is clear. 
Foreign country judgments. Judgments of foreign countries are 
not entitled to full faith and credit. In some states, a judgment creditor 
with a judgment from a court in a foreign country must sue to obtain a 
judgment in the United States which can then be enforced. However, 
115. 28 U.S.C. § 1962 (1988). See supra note 112 (quoting precise text). 
116. Strictly speaking, there is no requirement that the clerks take such action. The state law 
could not require action on the part of the federal clerks. It is, however, a requirement for a lien. 
117. The United States Constitution provides that: 
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial 
Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Man­
ner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof. 
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
118. MJLA § 2(a). 
119. See UNIFORM ENFORCEMENT OR JUDGMENTS ACT, 13 U.L.A. 9 (1995) (listing those 
states which have adopted the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act as: Alabama, 
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Geor­
gia, Hawaii. Idaho. Illinois, Iowa. Kansas. Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Mis­
sissippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York. North 
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Okiahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania. Rhode Island, South Carolina. 
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virgin Islands, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wis­
consin and Wyoming). 
120. UNIF. ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT § 2, 13 U.L.A. 154 (1995). 
121. The Uniform Act provides that, HA judgment so filed has the same effect and is subject 
to the same procedures, defenses and proceedings for reopening, vacating, or staying as a judgment 
of a [District court of any city or county] of this state and be enforced or satisfied in like manner." 
ld. 
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many states have adopted the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments 
Recognition ActY.l2 That Act provides that judgments of foreign coun­
tries should be treated the same as judgments of sister states.12lI There­
fore, foreign country judgments simply can be recorded to create a lien. 
Although the statute explicitly denies this status to judgments rendered 
in countries that do not have impartial tribunals, where there was no 
personal or subject matter jurisdiction, or where there was procedural 
unfairness.124 There is currently no procedure explicit in the statute re­
quiring court review of the foreign country judgment before recording. 
However, at least one court has held that recognizing foreign country 
judgments without such a court review is unconstitutional.126 Texas has 
modified the Act to include a procedure which may provide for consti­
tutional safeguards while still giving the Act the force and effect which 
was intended by the drafters.126 MJLA makes allowance for a similar 
122. See generally UNIFORM MONEy·JCDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, 13 U.L.A. 263 (1995) 
(listing those states which have adopted the Uniform Foreign Money·Judgments Recognition Act as: 
Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Maryland, Massachu· 
setts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virgin Islands, Virginia, Washington). See also ALASKA 
STAT. §§ 09.30.100-.180 (1972); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1713 (West 1967); COLO. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 13-62-101 to -109 (West 1977); CONN. GEN. STAT. A:SN. §§ 50a·30 to -38 (West 1988); 
GA. CODE ANN. § 9·12-110 to ·117 (1975); IDAHO CODE §§ 10·1401 to ·1409 (1990); ILL. ANN. 
STAT. ch. 735, para. 5/12-618 to ·626 (Smith-Hurd 1963); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 6268.1-.8 (West 
1989); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 10-701 to ·709 (1963); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 
235, § 23A (West 1966); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. §§ 691.1151-.1159 (West 1967); MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 548.35 (West 1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 511.770·.787 (Vernon 1984); MONT. CODE ANN. 
§§ 25-9-601 to ·609 (1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 39·4B-l to -9 (Michie Supp. 1991); N.Y. CIv. 
PRAC. L. & R. 5301-5309 (McKinney 1970); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ lC·1800 to 1808 (1993); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2329.90·.94 (Anderson 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 710-718 (West 
1965); OR. REV. STAT. § 24.200-.255 (1977); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 22001·22009 (1990); TEX. CIV. 
!'RAC. & REM. CODE A..c'iN. §§ 36.001·.008 (Vernon 1981); V.l CODE ANN. tit. 5, §§ 561·569 
(1992); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01·465.6 to .13 (Michie Supp. 1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§§ 6.40.010-.915 (West 1975). 
123. UNIF. FOREIGN MONEy·JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 3 (1986). 
124. Id. at § 4. 
125. See Plastics Eng'g Inc. V. Diamond Plastics Corp., 764 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1989); Detamore v. Sullivan, 731 S.W.2d 122 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987). 
126. Texas has modified the Act to include a procedure which may provide for constitutional 
safeguards while still giving the Act the force and effect which was intended by the drafters. TEX. 
Crv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 36.002·.004 (West 1981 & Supp. 1995). Texas does not auto· 
matically give full faith and credit to the foreign country judgment. Instead, a creditor must first file 
an authenticated judgment with the court clerk in the county where legal effect is sought. ld. 
§ 36.0041. Second, the creditor shall file with the clerk an affidavit showing the name and last 
known addresses of the judgment debtor and judgment creditor. ld. § 36.0042. Third, either the 
clerk or the judgment creditor mails notice of the filing to the debtor. ld. §§ 36.0042·0043. Fourth, 
the debtor is given an opportunity to contest the state's recognition of the foreign country judgment, 
within thirty days of receiving the filing. ld. § 36.0044(a). Fifth, the debtor shall file a motion of 
320 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 15:295 
procedure, but also explicitly provides an avenue right for the judgment 
debtor to have the lien notice removed if, for example, there was some 
defect in the foreign country procedure. ill7 
IV. JUDICIAL LIENS WHICH ARISE OTHER THAN BY JUDGMENT 
Pre-judgment attachment is an extraordinary remedy through 
which the plaintiff may deprive the defendant of property before any 
court has found liability on any grounds. All states limit the availabil­
ity to pre-judgment attachment to lawsuits based on particular grounds 
such as fraud,128 and to situations in which the plaintiff may be partic­
ularly vulnerable to a defendant's secreting or dissipating assets, such 
as where the defendant has evaded service of process or is likely to 
abscond from the state. us Pre-judgment attachment also provides the 
plaintiff with an advantage over other parties who may sue the debtor: 
the effective date of the judgment lien which the plaintiff eventually 
obtains will relate back to the date of the pre-judgment attachment. lao 
In addition to granting the plaintiff the security that the property will 
be available to satisfy the judgment, pre-judgment attachment provides 
the plaintiff with considerable leverag~ over the defendant. The defend­
ant, while being denied the use of some essential item of his property, is 
more likely to settle on favorable terms with the plaintiff. 
By incorporating pre-judgment attachment into the proposed sys­
tem, increased flexibility is offered to the courts, plaintiffs, and the 
debtor. It would be possible to extend the scope of a pre-judgment at­
tachment to all property that the defendant owns. But it would also be 
possible for the courts to grant the plaintiff a pre-judgment attachment 
without the sheriff actually taking possession of the property where spe­
cific property is to be bound by the attachment. In both cases, purchas­
ers and secured creditors would have notice of the limitation of the title 
nonrecognition of the judgment, along with any documentation which supports his contest, based on 
grounds set forth by the Act. Id. § 36.0044(b). The debtor may request an evidentiary hearing on 
the matter, and the court may grant or deny such a request in its discretion. [d. § 36.0044(e). The 
court will then decide whether or not to refuse recognition of the judgment. [d. § 36.0044(g). 
127. MJLA § 8(c)(ii). 
128. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-303(e) (1995) (debt incurred by 
fraud, home improvement violation); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 6201(3) (McKinney 1980 & Supp. 
1995) (sister state judgments, recovery of damages for commission of crime). 
129. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-303 (1995) (action to evade service, 
absconding debtor, fraudulent disposition of property); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 6201 (McKinney 
1980 & Supp. 1995) (inability to personally serve, fraudulent disposition of property). 
130. See, e.g., State v. Friedman, 283 Md. 701, 393 A.2d 1356 (Md. App. 1978). 
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which the defendant can convey.l3l Where the plaintiff can establish 
that this is not sufficient protection, the court could enjoin the defend­
ant from conveying or misusing the property, or, if necessary, the court 
could authorize seizure of the property.132 
The doctrine of lis pendens functions similarly to a pre-judgment 
attachment of land. The doctrine provides that if the pleadings explic­
itly place title to land at issue, any interests in the land that arise after 
the initiation of the lawsuit are subject to the court's decision in that 
law suit.13s This device provides constructive notice to purchasers of the 
land, thus, guaranteeing the creditor's priority over such buyers. In 
many states, a notice must be filed in the land records to enforce the 
doctrine.134 In others, the filing of a notice is not necessary. Purchasers 
and mortgagees need to consult court dockets for pending lawsuits 
against their transferors.136 The doctrine would survive under the pro­
posed system, but it may be necessary to continue to require that a 
specific notice be filed,ISG unless all law suits in the state are searchable 
in the statewide system. IS7 
V. MISCELLANEOUS PROBLEMS 
A. Transition to a New System 
The duration of judgment liens is generally between eight and 
twelve years. ISS Due process may require that creditors with liens that 
arose prior to legislation providing for the establishment of the MJLA 
system maintain their liens on real property for the balance of the 
131. MJLA § 6. Alternative A would be available in those systems in which the entire court 
docket is available for search and not just the judgments themselves. 
132. Barry Zaretsky, Attachment Without Seizure: A Proposal for a New Creditors' Remedy, 
1978 U. ILL. L.F. 819, 825 (1978). 
133. Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp., 670 F.2d 1316 (3d Cir. 1982). 
134. See, e.g., COl'l'N. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52·325 (West 1991 & Supp. 1994). 
135. See. e.g., Permanent Financial Corp. v. Taro, 526 A.2d 611 (Md. App. 1987). 
136. MJLA § 7 (Alternative B). 
137. Id. (Alternative A). Two counties are experimenting with systems in which the actual 
filing of documents can be done by modem from the lawyer's office. Other documents in those pro­
ceedings would be scanned electronically and available in a search of the court records. Arleen 
Jacoius, Two More Courts Add Electronic Filing, 81 A.B.A. J. 20 (Sept., 1955). In such a system, 
even Lis Pendens could operate without any additional notice filing. 
138. See ALA. CODE § 6-9-211 (1990) (10 years); CAL. CIV. PROC, CODE § 697.310 (West 
1987 & Supp. 1994) (10 years); CONN. GEN. STAT, ANN. § 52·380a (West 1991) (20 years); IOWA 
CODE ANN. § 624.23 (West 1989 & Supp. 1994) (10 years); MD. CODE ANN" CTS. & JUD. PROC. 
§ 5-102 (1993) (12 years) & MD, RULES § 2-625 (1993); N.Y, CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 5203(a) (Mc­
Kinney 1978 & Supp. 1994) (10 years). Cf ME. REV. STAT, ANN, tit. 14, § 3132 (West 1980) (until 
satisfied); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 511.360 (Vernon 1952 & Supp. 1994) (3 years). 
322 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 15:295 
judgments' lives. lall Of course, those creditors will maintain their out­
standing liens. However, after the effective date of the statute, all ac­
tion must be taken in compliance with the statute. Moreover, the pro­
posed statute provides for those judgment creditors who have obtained 
judgments prior to MJLA's effective date to record their judgments in 
the new system in order to take advantage of the statewide and ex­
panded property coverage of the new system.l40 
B. Search Efficiency 
The establishment of and reliance on a state-wide database will 
present problems of both "overinclusiveness" and "underinclusive­
ness."141 The "overinc1usiveness" involves two aspects. First, some 
names may be very common and thus a search by a prospective lender 
or buyer of property would turn up a large number of records.142 The 
inclusion of additional identifying information in the database at the 
time the judgment is rendered would be a partial solution to this prob­
lem. These include the debtor's address, date of birth and social secur­
ity or tax identification number. Such information already is included 
as a matter of course in some systems .. 143 With this additional informa­
tion a person can easily eliminate many, ifnot all, of the extraneous 
results of the search. Where the identifying information is not included 
in the record of the judgment, the law could require judgment creditors 
to obtain and supply such information. MJLA includes such a require­
ment in section 3(a). It should be noted that the proposal requires that 
139. In the text I refer to protecting only those liens arising prior to the legislation and not the 
institution of the proposed system. Presumably, after the system is legislated but before it is in place, 
judgment creditors would be on notice as to the necessity of filing with the new system. 
140. MJLA § 2(d). 
141. For a discussion of search problems and potential solutions in the context of potential 
computerization of V.C.C. filings, see Lynn LoPucki, Computerization of the Article 9 Filing Sys­
tem, 55 L. & CONTEMP. FROB., 5, 19-29 (Summer 1992). 
142. A search of California judgments in LEXIS turned up 388 debtors named Jim or James 
Jones. Fortunately only one appeared under Charles Shafer. The "All Judgments" file in LEXIS 
(which includes all of the states covered by LEXIS) turned up 573 John Smiths and only 27 Charles 
Shafers. 
143. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 674 (West Supp. 1993). Filing of the abstract without such 
information and no explanation will invalidate the judgment lien, since the creditor has not "substan­
tially complied with statutory formalities." Id. See Keele v. Reich, 169 Cal. App. 3d 1129, 1133 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (holding strict compliance with statutory guidelines is required). See also 
McKnight v. Faber, 185 Cal. App. 3d 639 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). 
A number of states require inclusion of the Tax Identification Number in V.C.C. Article 9 
filings. Edward S. Adams, et aI., A Revised Filing System: Recommendations and Innovations, 79 
MINN. L. REV. 877, 899 (1994). 
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the judgment creditor supply such information within one year. There­
fore any judgment older than one year for which such information is 
not available would not be protected by the lien. For those cases where 
the requirement of identifying information does not completely elimi­
nate the problem that the prospective buyer or lender cannot be sure 
that her prospective transferor is not one of the parties against whom a 
lien is established, the proposed statute provides a mechanism for the 
lender or buyer to contact the judgment creditor. The creditor's cooper­
ation is guaranteed by the available sanction of "suspending" the 
lien.144 
The problem of "underinclusiveness" is created where the search 
under the name of an individual or corporation does not turn up a rele­
vant judgment. This could be caused by either changes in the name of 
the debtor or slight variations in spelling. The latter problem now can 
be easily solved since a reasonable search would include all likely spell­
ings of the debtor's name.145 However, in cases where the debtor 
changes her name after the judgment, the problem is more compli­
cated. There are, however, a number of factors which will limit the 
problem. If the debtor is an individual and has legally changed her 
name, the judgment in such a case would be found by the computer 
search. If the debtor is a corporation that has changed its name, and if 
state corporate records were also searchable in the proposed system, 
such a name change would be located. If the debtor retains the same 
social security number or tax identification number, a search by social 
security number would locate appropriate judgments. Finally, where 
property is subject to a title recordation system (such as land and intel­
lectual property), the lien against the debtor will often be revealed. For 
example, suppose A gets a judgment against D while Downs Blackacre 
or before D acquires Blackacre. Subsequently, D changes her name to 
Q and reconveys Blackacre to herself under the name of Q. The title 
search of Q will produce record of D's ownership and the judgment 
search of D will produce A's lien. This would not be true if D had 
acquired the property under the name of Q. There would be no way for 
a purchaser of real property to find D in the chain of title. Further­
144. MJLA §§ 3(a), (b), (c), (d). 
145. My first name, Charles, could also be Chuck or Charlie. My last name is spelled by 
students as Shaffer, Schaefer, Schaeffer or Schafer. The search software could be easily constructed 
to search for all possible variations at once. In fact it could have a thesaurus of alternative spellings 
of many names. There is software already available that assists in searching for all words that sound 
like a particular word. Jacob R. Jacobs, Finding Words That Sound Alike: The Soundex Al­
gorithm, BYTE, March, 1982 at 473. 
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more, if intellectual property were involved, there is a possibility that 
the property could be owned by D at the time she was going under the 
name of D but never recorded under that name. It is not necessary to 
register a copyright in order to have a copyright.146 Registration is per­
missive.147 Therefore, if at the time A gets a judgment against D, D 
had written a book entitled "The Three Faces of D," A, by making the 
appropriate filings, would have a lien against D's copyright to that 
book. But if D then changes her name to Q and registers the copyright 
under the name Q, a potential buyer of that copyright could find no 
record of A's interest. 
Therefore, in those situations where an appropriate search could 
locate the judgment creditor's interest, the judgment creditor should 
not be defeated by the judgment debtor's change of name. These in­
clude situations where the search will locate official name changes or 
where a search by social security number would locate the lien. The 
judgment creditor should also be protected where the debtor's name is 
included in a title search of property. In the remaining situations the 
question is raised regarding how to allocate the risk of the change in 
the debtor's name. The U.C.c. provides that where the debtor materi­
ally changes her name, filing becomes ineffective with regard to collat­
eral acquired more than four months after the change.148 
The proposed system adopts this solution with the following excep­
tions. 1411 First, where a search by tax identification number or social 
security number would locate the judgment, the lien is retained. Sec­
ond, where the original name can be located in the chain of title for 
real property or intellectual property, the lien is retained. Third, the 
lien is only ineffective against those who obtain an interest in the prop­
erty before the judgment creditor eventually records the change of 
name. Fourth, the protection only applies to secured creditors and pur­
chasers. Subsequent judgment liens against the debtor under her new 
name would be subject to the prior recorded lien under the old name.u;o 
This deviation from the V.C.C. is based on the fact that judgment 
146. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988). 
147. [d. § 108. 
148. V.C.C. § 9-402(7) (1995). 
149. MJLA § 4(a)(ix). 
150. Of course, the original judgment creditor would still take the risk that the property would 
be seized and sold by the subsequent judgment creditor without anyone knowing that original judg­
ment creditor had an interest in the property. See MJLA § J(g)(viii). If the original judgment 
creditor intentionally allowed the debtor to operate under a new name and only later revealed her 
interest after others had become creditors of the debtor, such conduct would be penalized under 
MJLA § 4(a)(xv). Such conduct would be similar to a fraudulent conveyance buy would not be 
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creditors have not relied on the presence of clear title to specific prop­
erty in the same way as secured creditors and purchasers have. Finally, 
the proposed statute does not distinguish between property acquired 
before and after the change of name as does the U.C.C. While a se­
cured creditor's protection is specifically derived from the fact that she 
is allowing the debtor to retain specific property, the judgment creditor 
should be encouraged to locate and seize property in a diligent manner. 
The judgment creditor cannot claim to have placed reliance on the 
debtor owning specific property. Therefore, in this context, as opposed 
to the secured creditor context, it is not necessary to grant the original 
judgment creditor increased protection for property acquired prior to 
the change of name. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Modern technology could be a useful vehicle for overhauling the 
system for the enforcement of judgments. This article has illustrated 
some of the advantages of such a system, the problems that would be 
encountered in attempting to bring about that overhaul, and how these 
problems might be resolved. 
APPENDIX 
PROPOSED MODEL JUDGMENT LIEN ACT 
§ 1 Definition of Terms 
As used in this statute 
(a) Buy means to acquire an interest in property (other than a lien or 
security interest) for consideration in money or money's worth. 
(b) DEBTOR means a party against whom a money judgment is 
rendered. 
(c) INVESTMENT SECURITY means a security under [STATE REFER­
ENCE TO 8-102(c) of U.C.C.] 
(d) JUDGMENT CREDITOR means 
(I) a party in whose favor a money judgment is rendered, and 
(II) an assignee of the rights of a judgment creditor 
(e) LIEN means a right to have property sold in satisfaction of a judg­
ment by any of the following procedures: [INSERT STATUTORY 
REFERENCES TO ALL STATE PROCEDURES] 
voidable under thc Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act because the transfer (the lien) occurs prior to 
the fraudulent conduct. UNIF, FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS ACT § 4. 
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(f) PROPERTY means all rights to property in this state or the situs of 
which is not in any particular state or country including (but not lim~ 
ited to) all real property, personal tangible and intangible property, in-
tellectual property, choses in action, stock and other ownership inter-
ests, and accounts receivable whether or not the transfer of such 
property is governed by the laws of this state or depends on actions 
taken outside of this state. 
(g) PROTECTED PURCHASER means 
(i) A person who buys in the ordinary course of business and for 
less than $5,000 tangible personal property from a merchant who deals 
in goods of that kind. 
(ii) A person who buys for personal, family or household use prop-
erty the transfer of which must be recorded under the following stat-
utes of this state: [INSERT STATUTES] where the lien provided for 
under this title has not been so recorded. 
(iii) A person who buys for less than $5,000 property the transfer 
of which must be recorded under the following statutes of this state: 
[INSERT STATUTES] where the lien provided for under this title 
has not been so recorded. 
(iv) A person who buys or obtains a security interest in property 
governed by federal law where such law provides a separate place for 
the filing or recording of transfers of such property and where under 
such law the buyer or secured creditor has priority over the holder of 
the lien provided for under this title. 
(v) A person who buys personal property for personal, family or 
household use without knowledge of the lien created by this title other 
than property the transfer of which must be recorded under the follow-
ing statutes of this state: [INSERT STATUTES] where the lien pro-
vided for under this title has not been so recorded. 
(vi) A person who obtains an interest in property from a protected 
purchaser. 
(vii) A bona fide purchaser of an investment security under 
[STATE REFERENCE TO 8-302 OF U.C.C.], a holder in due course 
of a negotiable instrument under [STATE REFERENCE TO 3-302 
OF U.C.c.] and a holder to whom a negotiable document has been 
duly negotiated under [STATE REFERENCE TO 7-502 OF THE 
U.C.C.]. 
(viii) A purchaser at a properly conducted execution sale. 
(h) Purchase Money Security Interest means a security interest of per-
sonal property or a mortgage of real property to the extent that it is 
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(i) taken or retained by the seller of the property to secure all or 
part of its price; or 
(ii) taken by a person who by making advances or incurring an 
obligation gives value to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the 
use of the collateral if such value is in fact so used. 
(i) Security Interest means any interest in property to secure payment 
of an obligation governed by: [INSERT STATUTORY REFERENCE 
TO ARTICLE 9 AND STATE REAL PROPERTY MORTGAGE 
LAW]. 
U) A JUDGMENT is 
(i) RENDERED when [REFER TO ACT OF COURT 
REQUIRED] 
(ii) ENTERED when [REFER TO ACT OF CLERK REQUIRED] 
§ 2 Creation of a Judgment Lien 
(a) A lien on all property of the debtor, then owned or after acquired, 
to secure satisfaction of the judgment shall arise upon the rendition of 
a money judgment of the [LIST COURTS OF STATE] which is en-
tered after [EFFECTIVE DATE OF STATUTE]. 
(b) ALTERNATIVE A: A lien on all property of the debtor, then 
owned or after acquired, to secure satisfaction of the judgment shall 
arise upon the rendition of a money judgment of the [FEDERAL 
COURTS SITTING IN THIS STATE] which is entered after [EF-
FECTIVE DATE OF STATUTE]. 
ALTERNATIVE B: A lien on all property of the debtor, then owned or 
after acquired, to secure satisfaction of the money judgment of the 
[FEDERAL COURTS SITTING IN THIS STATE] which is entered 
after [EFFECTIVE DATE OF STATUTE] shall arise upon the re-
cording of a notice thereof in a database searchable through the 
software required by § 11 of this title. 
(c) Notwithstanding any other statute of this state, no lien which arises 
by virtue of any court order, judgment, execution, or the filing of notice 
of a court order, judgment, or execution, and which would not be effec-
tive but for any act not taken before [EFFECTIVE DATE OF STAT-
UTE], shall arise unless action is taken in compliance with this title. 
(d) A person who has a money judgment from any court of this state or 
who has imported into this state a money judgment from any other 
state, country or federal court may obtain a lien on all property of the 
debtor within this state by filing a notice of said judgment in compli-
ance with the rules set forth in § 3(a). 
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(e) A lien obtained by this statute shall be effective as of the date of 
rendition of the said judgment. 
(f) A lien obtained by this title shall be effective against all after-ac-
quired property of the debtor. 
(g) No judgment lien, whether or not obtained under this title, may be 
renewed other than under this title. 
(h) A lien which arises under this title shall expire when the statute of 
limitations has expired on the judgment upon which the lien is based, 
unless the judgment is revived prior to the expiration of the statute of 
limitations. 
§ 3 Procedure for Creating & Maintaining a Judgment Lien 
(a)(i) A lien obtained under § 2(a) of this title shall expire one year 
after the lien arises if the judgment creditor does not file a statement as 
set forth in subsection (b) of this section where the information is not 
contained therein is not already included in the database required by 
§ 10 of this title. 
(ii) A lien may not be obtained under any section of this title other 
than § 2(a) unless the judgment creditor files a statement as set forth 
in subsection (b). 
(iii) A lien obtained under this title shall lapse if the creditor's 
address changes and notice of such change is not filed with the clerk of 
any Circuit Court within thirty (30) days. 
(b) When required by this title, the judgment creditor shall file with 
[CLERKS OR OFFICES WITH WHICH INFORMATION MUST 
BE FILED] the following information, or a sworn statement indicating 
why such information is not available: 
(i) Debtor's current name; 
(ii) Debtor's Social Security Number or Tax LD. Number; 
(iii) Debtor's Date of Birth; 
(iv) Debtor's last known address; 
(v) Judgment creditor's name; 
(vi) Creditor's current address; and 
(vii) Sworn statement by the creditor that the judgment is valid, 
enforceable, and unsatisfied. 
(c) The judgment creditor must respond within thirty (30) days to any 
person who seeks to determine whether a particular person is or is not 
the debtor. 
(d) Any person may petition [NAME OF COURT] for an order de-
claring any lien created by this title suspended where the judgment 
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creditor has failed to respond as required by subsection (c) of this 
section. 
(e) The judgment creditor may petition [NAME OF COURT] for an 
order reviving a lien suspended by subsection (d) of this section. 
(f) Any person may petition [NAME OF COURT] for an order de-
claring a lien arising under this title void by reason of the satisfaction 
of the judgment, the expiration of the lien under § 2(g) or discharge in 
bankruptcy. 
(g) The judgment creditor may petition [NAME OF COURT] for an 
order reviving a judgment. 
(h) (i) Where the judgment debtor so changes his name that the lien 
under this title could not be discovered upon a reasonable search the 
judgment creditor must file a revised statement within four months of 
the date the debtor adopts the new name. 
(ii) If the judgment creditor does not comply with the requirement 
subsection (h)(i), all property owned by the judgment debtor shall be 
deemed protected until the judgment creditor so complies. 
(iii) The following property is not protected: All real property and 
intangible property subject to a federal recording system where the 
debtor's ownership is recorded. 
§ 4 Priority of Claims 
(a) The lien provided for in this title shall be effective against the 
debtor, all creditor's of the debtor and all parties who claim any inter-
est in the property of the debtor except for 
(i) Judgment creditors with liens which arose prior to the time of 
the lien in question; 
(ii) A protected purchaser; 
(iii) A purchase money security interest; 
(iv) A person with regard to whom the judgment creditor has not 
responded as required by § 3(c) of this title and who's interest in the 
property arose after the time for such response has past; 
(v) A person who had a security interest in personal property 
under [STATE REFERENCE TO ARTICLE] which defeats a lien 
creditor; 
(vi) A person who had a mortgage in real property under [STATE 
STATUTORY REFERENCE] which defeats a lien creditor prior to 
the date on which the lien in question arose; 
(vii) A possessory lien created by [STATE STATUTORY 
REFERENCE] ; 
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(viii) Any interest in property acquired after the lien was sus-
pended under § 3(d) of this title and before the lien was revived under 
§ 3 (e) of this title; 
(ix) A person with a security interest in a certificated investment 
security who has priority over a lien creditor under 8-321 and Article 9 
of the U.C.C.; 
(x) A person with a security interest or a judgment lien in an in-
vestment security who has priority over a lien creditor under 8-321 or 
Article 9 of the U.C.C. unless 
(A) The chief executive office of the issuer is in this state, or 
(B) (I) The chief executive office of the issuer is in a state which 
provides for the filing of judgment liens, and 
(II) The lien in the investment security has been filed prior to the 
time that the judgment lien in question was filed in that state. 
(xi) A person with an interest in a copyright who has priority 
under 35 U.S.C. § 261; 
(xii) A purchaser or mortgagee of a patent who has priority under 
17 U.s.C. § 205(d); 
(xiii) A person with an interest in a trademark which arises prior 
to the sale of the trademark at an execution sale or a judicial sale; 
(xiv) A person who buys or obtains a security interest in property 
while it is protected by § 3(h) of this title; 
(xv) A person who becomes a creditor of while the property is pro-
tected by § 3(h) of this title if the judgment creditor knows of the 
change of name. 
§ 5 Statute of Limitations of a Judgment Lien 
(a) [INCORPORATE STATE STATUTE OF LIMITATION] 
(b) No renewal or revival of a judgment shall create a lien under this 
title unless the judgment creditor files a statement as forth in § 3(b) of 
this title. 
§ 6 Pre-JUdgment Attachment 
(a) ALTERNATIVE A: For states where complete docket information 
is searchable: A person may obtain a lien under this title on all of the 
property of another person, or upon specific property by obtaining a 
pre-judgment attachment. 
(b) ALTERNATIVE B: For states where complete docket information 
is not searchable:(i) A person may obtain a lien under this title on all 
of the property of another person, or upon specific property by ob-
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taining a prewjudgment attachment and filing said order [INSERT 
WHERE FILING MUST BE MADE]. 
(ii) A pre-judgment lien shall be shall be subject to the rules set 
forth [INSERT STATE STATUTORY REFERENCE]. 
§ 7 Lis Pendens Notices 
(a) Where a plaintiff is entitled to protection of the doctrine of lis 
pendens, a lien shall be created under this title. 
(i) ALTERNATIVE A: For states where complete docket infor-
mation is searchable: as of the date of the commencement of the law 
suit. 
(ii) ALTERNATIVE B: For states where complete docket infor-
mation is not searchable: by filing notice thereof [INSERT WHERE 
FILING MUST BE MADE] 
§ 8 Foreign Judgments 
(a) Upon the filing [INSERT WHERE FILING MUST BE 
MADE]of an out-of-state federal court judgment a lien shall arise 
under this title. 
(b) Upon the filing of a foreign state judgment [INSERT WHERE 
FILING MUST BE MADE] a lien under this title shall arise. 
(c)(i) Upon the filing of a judgment of a foreign country [INSERT 
WHERE FILING MUST BE MADE] a lien under this title shall 
arise. However, the judgment creditor shall not be entitled to proceed 
against any property of the debtor until the creditor has complied with 
the provisions of [INSERT STATE STATUTE]. 
(ii) Any party in interest may move in [INSERT NAME OF 
COURT] for removal of the notice filed under subsection (c) (i) of this 
section for good cause. 
§ 9 Property rights controlled or created by other jurisdictions 
(a) Where federal1aw or the law of another state provides a separate 
place for the filing or recording of transfers of particular types of prop-
erty, any creditor may obtain an order from the [STATE FILLS IN 
APPROPRIATE COURT] authorizing the creditor to file a notice of a 
lien created by this title. Such notice shall include a copy of the court 
order. 
(b) The court shall issue such order only after a hearing upon notice to 
the party against whom the transfer is alleged. 
(c) The order may specify the particular property in which the creditor 
claims an interest. 
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(d) The order shall authorize the sheriff to sell the debtor's interest in 
the property. 
(e) To the extent that federal law governs the priority of interest in 
property such law shall govern the priority of liens established under 
this title. 
(f) In the case of the execution of a state or federal trademark, the 
purchaser first must be: 
(i) in the business of sufficiently similar products and/or services; 
and 
(ii) transfer of such trademark must not lead to consumer confu-
sion as to the established associations of the mark. 
§ 10 Creation of Searchable Database 
(a) The [INSERT NAME OF STATE OFFICE] shall create or oth-
erwise obtain software which is capable of searching under the name of 
any person in all of the Databases provided for in this section and lo-
cating the following information about that person: 
(i) All judgments which create liens under § 2(a) of this title. 
(ii) All notices provided for under § 2( c) of this title. 
(iii) All notices provided for under § 3(b) of this title. 
(iv) ALTERNATIVE A: All court orders provided for under 
§ 6(a) of this title. 
ALTERNATIVE B: All filings provided for under § 6(a) of this 
title. 
(v) ALTERNATIVE A: All pleadings which may establish a right 
to the doctrine of lis pendens. 
ALTERNATIVE B: All filings provided for under § 7(a) of this 
title. 
(b) The [INSERT TITLES OF CLERKS OR OTHER OFFICERS] 
shall enter into a database all of the items specified in Subsection (a) of 
this section. 
(c) The [INSERT TITLES OF CLERKS OR OTHER OFFICERS] 
shall remove from the database or shall identify as purged a record of a 
judgment where the lien has expired under § 3(a) of this title or has 
been declared void under § 3(f) of this title. 
(d) The [INSERT TITLES OF CLERKS OR OTHER OFFICERS] 
shall remove from the database or shall identify as suspended a record 
of a judgment where there has been an order suspending the lien under 
§ 3( d) of this title. 
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(e) The [INSERT TITLES OF CLERKS OR OTHER OFFICERS] 
shall enter into the database or shall identify as revived a record of a 
judgment where there has been an order reviving the lien under § 3(e) 
of this title. 
§ 11 Availability of Software and Terminals 
(a) [Provision that terminals for searching the databases required by 
§ 10 should be available in courts of the state] 
(b) [OPTIONAL: Provision that software should be made available so 
that any person can search the databases from a remote location, i.e. 
dial up by modem]. 
